Approximately two-thirds of Indian women migrate for marriage, with roughly one-fifth relocating across district boundaries. This paper investigates the consequences of marriage migration across districts and its impact on intra-household inequality. We first document new empirical facts on the relationship between sex ratios and marriage migration, showing that male-skewed sex ratios increase migration in rural areas but have no significant effect in urban areas. We then estimate a collective household marriage market model to understand the impact of marriage migration on women’s bargaining power. We find that migration to rural areas lowers bargaining power, while migration to urban areas increases it. Counterfactuals show these patterns are not driven by selection but by destination-specific treatment. While dowry strongly reduces bargaining power, we find limited evidence of a dowry–migration trade-off.

The correct measurement of economic policy uncertainty (EPU) plays a critical role in many policy settings - in particular where economic policy decisions need to be taken in response to large shocks. One such large shock is armed conflict. But, counterintuitively, the standard text-based EPU index systematically declines during armed conflict periods. Using a global news corpus covering 192 countries and over 5 million articles, we show that this decline is driven not by reduced uncertainty, but by a crowding out of reporting on economics and policy. We show that a combination of topic modeling and two-way fixed effects can be used to adjust the measurement of EPU, providing a new view on political risk during armed conflict. After adjustment, the EPU aligns more closely with firm perceptions, political risk insurance and investment during armed conflict.